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JUDICIAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE LEGACY 
OF THE REHNQUIST COURT 
NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE 
SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES. By 
John T. Noonan, Jr. 1 University of California Press. 2002. 
Pp. 203. $24.95. 
E. Thomas Sullivan2 
Two hundred years a~o, in 1803, the Supreme Court de-
cided Marbury v. Madison. This seminal case established judi-
cial review of legislation and executive action. It may well be the 
Supreme Court's most important, celebrated opinion. 
The story of Marbury is well known. Chief Justice Marshall, 
the author of the opinion, was an ardent Federalist from Vir-
ginia. The case was born and decided amidst great political tur-
moil during the transition from John Adams' presidency to 
Thomas Jefferson's. As Adams' term was coming to a close, 
Congress-dominated by the federalists-passed the Judiciary 
Act of 1801,4 creating 16 new federal judgeships. Adams invoked 
his prerogative and nominated the 16 federal court judges before 
he left office. The Senate confirmed each. In addition, legislation 
authorized the President to appoint a number of justices of the 
peace for the District of Columbia. Marbury was one of those 
nominated and confirmed. His commission was sealed before 
Adams' term expired, though not delivered before Adams left 
the presidency. Interestingly, Marshall had been Adams' Secre-
tary of State and was responsible for delivering Marbury's judi-
cial commission. 
I. Robbins Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley; Senior 
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
2. Irving Younger Professor of Law and former Dean, University of Minnesota 
Law School. I am grateful for the comments received on a draft of this article from Toni 
Massaro, Ted Schneyer, Robert Glennon, and Ana Maria Merico-Stephens. Apprecia-
tion also is extended to Matt Scheidt and David James for their able research assistance. 
3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Marbury and the 
Constitutional Mind· A Bicentennial Essay of the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 CAL. L. 
REV. 1 (2003). 
4. Act of Feb. 13, 1801,2 Stat. 89 (1801), repealed March 8, 1802. 
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President Jefferson refused to recognize Marbury's commis-
sion and appointment. Marbury challenged Jefferson's refusal to 
acknowledge Adams' commissions. Marbury invoked as grounds 
for jurisdiction the Judiciary Act of 1789,5 which granted original 
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus. 
Marbury petitioned the Court to mandamus James Madison, the 
new secretary of state, to deliver the commissions. The Court 
ordered Madison to show cause why the writ of mandamus 
should not issue ordering him to deliver the commission to Mar-
bury. 
In an elegant, brilliant opinion, Chief Justice Marshall held 
that Marbury was entitled to his office, but that the Supreme 
Court lacked the jurisdiction to issue a writ because Congress, in 
establishing the writ of mandamus in the Judiciary Act, violated 
the Constitution which set forth the Court's power, but did not 
include the writ of mandamus in the Court's original jurisdiction. 
Congress, Marshall concluded, was without authority to expand 
the Court's power beyond those set forth in Article III. The 
Court, therefore, could not give Marbury a remedy for what the 
Court acknowledged had been a violation of his rights. 
Although clearly limiting the Court's remedial power, Chief 
Justice Marshall, importantly, interpreted the Constitution to 
give the Court its ultimate power-the power of judicial review. 
He stated, emphatically, that "the province ... of the judicial 
department [is] to say what the law is."6 In doing so, he acknowl-
edged with great care the right of both the executive and legisla-
tive branches to interpret the Constitution within the sphere of 
their own power. He cautioned that "the province of the Court is 
solely to decide on the rights of individuals not to inquire how 
the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they 
have a discretion." 
Marbury, therefore, launched a two-hundred-year history of 
judicial review in the United States. Indeed, the Court during 
Chief Justice Marshall's tenure went on to recognize that Con-
gress had broad discretion to apply and, in the first instance, to 
interpret the Constitution. The Marshall Court did not declare 
another congressional act unconstitutional during the 34 years of 
Chief Justice Marshall's tenure, during which he authored more 
than 500 opinions. 
5. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 13 (1789). 
6. 5 U.S. at 177. 
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Marshall's expansive interpretation of Congress' power, 
especially under the commerce clause, as demonstrated in 
Gibbons v. Ogden7 and McCulloch v. Maryland,8 makes the 
ascendancy of judicial supremacy surprising. This current turn of 
events, featuring the supremacy of state rights over the fe~eral 
government, surely would have alarmed James Madison, the 
"father" of the Constitution, as well as John Marshall. 
This contemporary revolution in narrowing Congress' 
power is well documented in John T. Noonan, Jr.'s recent book, 
Narrowing the Nation's Power. Judge Noonan, a well-regarded 
former law professor, legal historian, and senior judge on the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, forcefully 
argues that the Rehnquist Court is undermining both the struc-
ture of the Constitution and the core principles of democratic 
society by its unprecedented embrace of federalism and its en-
hanced autonomy of the States. 
Judge Noonan raises important legal and public policy ques-
tions about the path the Rehnquist Court has taken: Is Congress 
still an equal and coordinate branch of government? What has 
happened to deference to political branches by unelected 
judges? Why is there such disrespect by the present Court for 
the doctrine of stare decisis, the tradition of following earlier ju-
dicial decisions? Does the expansion of judicial review interfere 
with republican self-government? 10 Is the Court's present inter-
pretation of Congress' power ahistorical? Does judicial review 
have no boundaries? Is the Court's authority exclusive over the 
Constitution? 11 Has judicial activism replaced judicial restraint 
as the overriding conservative theme? 12 Why has Congress not 
objected to restrictions on its domain and powers, especially 
when there often has been bipartisan approval of many acts, now 
over 30 in the past decade, declared unconstitutional by the 
Court? Have we arrived at an Imperial Court? 
Judge Noonan's critique of the Rehnquist Court's recent 
federalism decisions not only centers on the revival of state 
7. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824). 
8. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). 
9. GARRY WILLS, JAMES MADISON 21, 24,39-43 (2002). 
10. See generally Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We 
The Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 158-69 (2001). 
II. See generally Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Protecting the Constitution From the 
People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L. J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter, 
Post & Siegel, Protecting]; Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal 
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000). 
12. Cass R. Sunstein, Taking Overthe Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, at A29. 
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rights but on the larger policy issue of judicial supremacy over 
deference to Congress. Regarding state sovereignty, he strongly 
disagrees with the Court's recent assertion that "the States en-
tered the federal system with their sovereignty intact" (p. 2):13 
"[T]o anyone familiar with the precedents of that Court or with 
the text of the Constitution of the United States or with the his-
tory of the Civil War," Judge Noonan remarks, "this] is an ex-
traordinary statement" (p. 2). He considers much of the Court's 
federalism jurisprudence since 1995 to be "profoundly ahistori-
cal" (p.83). For him, the Court has undone, through its expanded 
view of judicial review, scores of incontestable constitutional 
principles. He further laments the Court's "complete indiffer-
ence to the individual plaintiffs"14 and to giving justice to per-
sons in these cases (p. 145). His arguments are punctuated with 
strong language: 
The claim that the sovereignty of the states is constitutional 
rests on the audacious addition to the Eleventh Amendment, 
a pretense that it incorporates the idea of state sovereignty. 
Neither the text nor the legislative history of the amendment 
supports this claim, nor does an appeal to the history contem-
poraneous with the amendment. A rhetorical advantage is 
gained by the current court referring to the state sovereignty 
as 'an Eleventh Amendment' matter. The constitutional con-
nection is imaginary (p. 151-152). 
The Court's rhetorical abstractions, according to him, lose sight 
of our country's motto-e pluribus unum-from many (states) to 
one (country) (p. 14). 
Narrowing the Nation's Power covers four constitutional ar-
eas that form the core of the Rehnquist Court's federalism juris-
prudence: (1) the commerce clause, (2) the lOth Amendment, 
(3) the 11th Amendment, and (4) section 5 of the 14th Amend-
ment. 
COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISDICfiON 
The federalism revolution under Chief Justice Rehnquist 
began in earnest with the 1995 case of United States v. Lopez,15 a 
13. See Federal Maritime Comm. v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 
1864 (2002). 
14. See David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 293 (1976). . 
15. 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also Solid Waste Agency of No. Cook County v. Uruted 
States Corps of Eng's., 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000); 
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case that required interpretation of the commerce clause. From 
the Court's first commerce clause decision in 1824 in Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 16 through the Court's commerce clause cases from 193717 
to mid-1970s, the Court had given Congress broad authority to 
legislate under its constitutionally "enumerated powers" as forti-
fied by its authority to enact laws that are "necessary and 
proper" in order to carry out the enumerated powers. 
Lopez shocked the country by reallocating power between 
the States and the federal government. The result was a signifi-
cant narrowing of Congress' powers. It was the first Supreme 
Court case since 1937 to strike down a federal statute as a viola-
tion of the commerce clause. The Court held that when Congress 
enacted the Gun-Free School Zones Act, making it a federal of-
fense for an individual knowingly to possess a firearm in a school 
zone, it exceeded its commerce clause authority, since possession 
of a gun in a local school zone is not, according to the Court, an 
economic or commercial activity that substantially affects inter-
state commerce. 
The second commerce clause case to fall victim to the ad-
vances of federalism was United States v. Morrison, 18 decided 
five years after Lopez. At issue in Morrison was the constitu-
tionality of a federal statute that provided a civil remedy for vic-
tims of gender-motivated violence. Again, the Court struck 
down section 13981 of the statute, concluding that Congress 
lacked commerce clause powers since gender-motivated crimes 
of violence, such as rape, were not considered economic or 
commercial activity substantially affecting interstate commerce. 
Clearly, the Court was drawing the line of Congress' power at 
commercial or economic activity only. 
Judge Noonan cites with approval the dissenting view of 
four justices in Morrison that "for the better part of the twenti-
eth century, since 1937, the Supreme Court had accepted the 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
16. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824). Several cases from 1887 to 1937 struck down Con-
gress's commerce clause exercises. 
17. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding congres-
sional power to regulate "those activities having a substantial relation to interstate com-
merce"). Since 1937, no commerce clause statutes have been held invalid except those in 
Lopez and Morrison. See also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122 (1942). 
18. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). On the different question of Congress' power under section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court found it an unconstitutional invocation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment since the statute governed the conduct of private individuals 
without a showing of harm caused by the state. Private conduct was not subject to Con-
gress' section 5 discretion to regulate, said the Court. 
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commerce power of Congress as 'plenary'; the power had not 
been restricted to a category" -such as economic or commercial 
activity (p. 133). As John Marshall reasoned in Gibbons, "The 
power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, 
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limi-
tations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution" (p. 133). 
Noonan draws from Gibbons the principles that once "a rational 
basis for its exercise of the commerce power" was found, "the 
court's function was over" (p. 133), and that "the power of Con-
gress, [as expressed by Justice Marshall in Gibbons] over com-
merce could be exercised as 'absolutely as it would be in a single 
government"' (p. 134). 19 
Although the Gibbons "rational basis" standard had long 
guided the exercise of commerce clause power, the Court, in 
Lopez and Morrison, insisted on a much higher level of congres-
sional fact-finding before Congress could legislate. The Court 
did concede in Lopez that "Congress need [not] make 
particularized findings in order to legislate, "20 and added that 
Congress "is not required to make formal findings as to the sub-
stantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce."21 
Nevertheless, the Court, as the Court of Appeals below had 
done,22 hinted that the holding might have been different if Con-
gress had made explicit findings connecting guns in local schools 
to a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
Justice Souter, in dissent, noted that historically this is the 
wrong standard: "The only question is whether the legislative 
judgment is within the realm of reason."23 Justice Breyer, also in 
dissent, cited substantial authority for the point, that the Court's 
duty is to judge the commerce connection independently of the 
Congressional findings and that the only test the Court has em-
ployed is whether there is a "rational basis" for the congressional 
action.Z4 Indeed, he documents that the rational basis test tradi-
tionally has been not whether Congress made an explicit finding 
19. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 
(1981) ("[T]he only remaining question for judicial inquiry is whether the means chosen 
by Congress [are] reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.") 
20. 514 U.S. at 562-63; see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964) 
("no formal findings were made, which of course are not necessary"). 
21. 514 U.S. at 562. 
22. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1363-68 (5th Cir. 1993). 
23. 514 U.S. at 613 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
24. /d. at 617-19 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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connecting the conduct to interstate commerce but rather 
whether Congress "could have had a rational basis."25 
The holding in Morrison makes clear that the specificity of 
congressional fact-finding is not determinative of the constitu-
tionality of Congress' exercise of commerce clause discretion, as 
Lopez had implied. Judge Noonan carefully marshals the evi-
dence to demonstrate, as the dissent in Morrison had done, that 
Congress had before it a "mountain of data showing the effects 
on interstate commerce of violence against women" (p. 131). No 
matter, Chief Justice Rehnquist, while conceding that, contrary 
to Lopez, the statute in question in Morrison "is supported by 
numerous findings regarding the serious impact that flender-
motivated violence has on victims and their families," 2 makes 
the majority's larger point that the march of judicial supremacy 
and federalism is now more important than Congress' long-
standing power under the commerce clause: 
[T]he existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by 
itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause leg-
islation .... [S]imply because Congress may conclude that a 
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce 
does not necessarily make it so .... Rather, [w]hether particu-
lar operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come 
under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them 
is ultimately a judicial rather than a le~islative question, and 
can be settled finally only by this Court. 7 
Morrison, therefore, implicitly rejects the "rational basis" 
test that had been upheld against commerce clause challenges in 
scores of Supreme Court cases, including numerous civil rights 
acts.28 Plainly, the new majority is strongly in favor of expanding 
federalism in order to develop "an enclave for the states to rule" 
(p. 134). and in favor of expanding judicial review over Con-
gress' commerce clause discretion. According to the present ma-
jority, Congress lacks power unless the activity sought to be 
regulated is directly economic or commercial in character. As 
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded in Morrison, we uphold 
"Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where 
the activity is economic in nature ... [even the] conduct's aggre-
25. /d. at 618 (emphasis added). 
26. 529 U.S. at 614. 
27. /d. 
28. See e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-55 
(Souter, J., dissenting). 
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gate effect on interstate commerce29 is not enough when Con-
gress seeks to regulate noneconomic conduct. In dismay, Judge 
Noonan observes that the Court in Lopez and Morrison "was 
giving the states more autonomlo than their own chief prosecu-
tors thought desirable" (p. 135), 0 with the result that the federal 
government's power to regulate had been narrowed drastically. 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
In addition to the commerce clause problem in Morrison, 
the Court also struck down the civil remedy of the Violence 
Against Women Act on the ground that this remedy was outside 
Congress' remedial power under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, because the statute governed the conduct of pri-
vate individuals rather than harm caused by the State. Section 5 
states that Congress may "enforce by 'appropriate legislation' 
the constitutional guarantee that no state shall deprive any per-
son of 'life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,' nor 
deny any person 'equal protection of the laws."' The Court con-
cluded that the Fourteenth Amendment, at its core, prohibits 
only state action.31 Here, the Court found that the statute was 
aimed at individuals who have committed criminal acts moti-
vated by gender bias, not the State itself. 
In his condemnation of the Court's section 5 cases, Judge 
Noonan notes that "[t]he Congress that drafted the Fourteenth 
Amendment after the Civil War had been deeply suspicious of 
the Supreme Court" (p. 28). "[The drafters] gave power for the 
amendment's enforcement to Congress" (p. 28). He observes 
that Ex parte Virginia,32 decided eleven years after the Four-
teenth Amendment had been ratified by the States, discussed 
congressional power under the amendment: 
It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged .... 
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry 
out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends 
to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to 
secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil 
rights and the equal protection of the laws against state denial 
29. 529 U.S. at 613,617. 
30. Thirty-eight states through their Attorneys General had urged Congress to pass 
the Violence Against Women Act (pp. 134-35). 
31. 529 U.S. at 621. 
32. 100 U.S. 339 (1879). 
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or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of 
congressional power (p. 28-29). 
179 
But the Morrison majority reigned in this broad, remedial lan-
guage with an admonition that "prophylactic legislation under 
§ 5 must have a 'congruence and proportionality' between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to 
that end."33 
The same "congruence and proportionality" test had been 
cited earlier in City of Boerne v. Flores34 where the Court over-
ruled, as unconstitutional, the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act. Judge Noonan thunders at this invented standard: "This 
formula was unprecedented. Proportionality in legislation! Who 
would measure the proportion? ... [With this requirement there 
is] a need for a court to look more closely at what evils the legis-
lation was said to be eliminating or preventing" (p. 35-36). For 
many, this new standard permits the Court to act as a super leg-
islature in substituting its subjective judgment for that of the 
elected body and the executive who signs the legislation, thus 
undermining democratic principles of the Republic. 35 
Others have posited that separation of power principles also 
are implicated as the Court, both in Morrison and Boerne, feared 
Congress' power under section 5 "as challenging the Court's ul-
timate authority to interpret the 14th Amendment."36 The 
Court's "juricentric Constitution," these authors assert, leaves 
the Court as the "exclusive authority of the Constitution.37 
The juricentric Constitution imagines the judiciary as the ex-
ecutive guardian of the Constitution. It allows the Court's co-
ordinate branches to enforce the Constitution only insofar as 
they enforce judicial interpretations of constitutional mean-
ing, an approach that radically circumscribes Congress' power 
under § 5 of the 14th Amendment. The Court justifies these 
restrictions in a way that fundamentally misdescribes Ameri-
33. 529 U.S. at 625-26. 
34. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See also Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
35. But see Suzanne Sherry, Irresponsibility Breeds Contempt, 6 GREEN BAG 2d 47, 
49 (2002) (arguing that this statute cannot be authorized under section 5 because Con-
gress only has "the power to enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It does not give Congress any additional power to enlarge or interpret those 
provisions"). See also, Ana Maria Merico-Stephens, United States v. Morrison and the 
Emperor's Clothes, 27 J.C. & U.L. 735 (2001). 
36. Post & Siegel, Protecting, supra note 11. 
37. !d. at 3. 
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can constitutional culture. . . . [Its] recent decisions . . . are 
fundamentally indifferent to the subtle but fundamental inter-
connections between the constitutional dimensions of our po-
litical life and the democratic dimensions of our constitutional 
culture.38 
THE TENTH AMENDMENT 
Early in his tenure, (then) Justice Rehnquist identified the 
Tenth Amendment as a constitutional principle that needed re-
visiting.39 That provision reserves to the States (or to the people) 
those powers not delegated to the federal government by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited to the States.4° For the first time in 
four decades, in 1976, the Court, in an opinion authored by then 
Justice Rehnquist, struck down a congressional act under the 
Tenth Amendment. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 41 the 
Court held unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment the 
Federal Labor Standards Act, which extended the minimum 
wage provisions to state and municipal (police and firefighters) 
employees, because Congress, the Court concluded, had invaded 
an "attribute of state sovereignty" by enacting the statute. The 
Rehnquist opinions gave new dignity to the States. These opin-
ions were couched in terms of the structure of the Constitution, 
particularly when the Tenth Amendment was read together with 
the Eleventh Amendment.42 According to Justice Rehnquist, 
"Congress may not exercise [its] power so as to force directly 
upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions regard-
ing the conduct of integral government functions are to be 
made .... [S]uch assertions of power if unchecked, would indeed 
... allow 'the National Government [to] devour the essentials of 
38. !d. at 25. ("The ultimate reduction of this approach is that Congress can legis-
late pursuant to § 5 only to remedy violations that courts have already condemned"). 
39. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,550 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice 
Rehnquist's dissent here might well be considered the beginning of his long-sought desire 
to reinterpret the Constitution toward a federalism theme. 
40. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
41. 426 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1976) ("States as States stand on a quite different footing 
from an individual or corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress's power to 
regulate commerce."); see also Fry, 421 U.S. at 549 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
42. Fry, 421 U.S. at 557 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[The Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendments) are simply examples of the understanding of those who drafted and rati-
fied the Constitution that the States were sovereign in many respects, and that although 
their legislative authority could be superceded by Congress in many areas where Con-
gress was competent to act, Congress was nonetheless not free to deal with a State as if it 
were just another individual or business enterprise subject to regulation."). 
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state sovereignty."43 Although National League of Cities moved 
the federalism debate to the forefront, it did not make further 
distinctions to clarify when state rights were violated. Nearly ten 
years later, the Court, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Authority,44 overruled National League of Cities with quite a dif-
ferent view of federalism. With Garcia, the Court returned to the 
pre-National League of Cities view of state sovereignty. 
Writing for the Court in Garcia, Justice Blackmun elabo-
rated on the "process of federalism" that balances the interest 
involved with more emphasis on the "political process," rather 
than judicial review, to inform the contours of the Tenth 
Amendment. Focusing on the "procedural safeguards inherent 
in the structure" of the federal political process, the majority 
concluded, "ensures that [the federal] laws that unduly burden 
the states will not be promulgated. "45 In the end, Justice Black-
mun concluded that "the model of democratic decisionmaking 
the Court [in National League of Cities] identified underesti-
mated ... the solicitude of national political process for the con-
tinued vitality of the States."46 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist cau-
tioned the majority that his long view toward reading the Tenth 
and Eleventh Amendments and the commerce clause as a single 
theme embracing federalism would eventually prevail. "I do not 
think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out further 
the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time 
again command the support of a majority of this Court. "47 
Judge Noonan chose not to include these Tenth Amend-
ment cases as part of his argument. This is regrettable since Nar-
rowing The Nation's Power would have profited from their in-
clusion. In many respects Chief Justice Rehnquist's early 
opinions in Fry and National League of Cities revealed his almost 
singular drive or preoccupation with federalism as an overarch-
ing theme of the Constitution.48 His impressionist view of the 
Tenth Amendment, together with how he shaped the Court's 
dramatic reinterpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, created 
43. 426 U.S. at 855. 
44. 469 u.s. 528 (1985). 
45. !d. at 552, 556, quoted in KENNETH W. STARR, FIRST AMONG EQUALS 235-36 
(2002). 
46. /d. at 565-57. 
47. /d. at 580 (Rehnquist J., dissenting). See generally Ana Maria Merico-Stephens, 
Of Maine's Soveretgnty, Alden's Federalism, and the Myth of Absolute Principles, The 
Newest Oldest Question of Consututional Law, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 325 (2000). 
48. Tony Mauro, The Rehnqutst Revolutwn's Humble Start, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 3, 
2003, at I, 10. 
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a new structural canvas from which the present Supreme Court 
views the Constitution and its role in interpreting the Constitu-
tion. 
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
Clearly, the most persuasive section of Judge Noonan's 
book is his rich, historical discussion of the Court's treatment of 
the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment cases are 
the cases most at odds with majoritarian principles of democratic 
society-where the elected branches of government, the Con-
gress and the presidency, are given greater deference. These are 
the cases that come closest to the Lochner-era49 approach to ju-
dicial review. These cases demonstrate the path that the modern 
Court has traveled to broaden state sovereignty and immunity in 
ways that depart from the founders' understanding of these con-
cepts.50 
In the last ten years, the Court has decided fourteen cases 
on Eleventh Amendment grounds, culminating in the most radi-
cal interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment in Federal Mari-
time Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority.51 The 
result is a vastly different interpretation of the amendment than 
its original understanding in 1798. On its face, the Eleventh 
Amendment says federal judicial power does not extend to a suit 
against a state "by citizens of another state, or by citizens or sub-
jects of any foreign state."52 As the Court now interprets the 
amendment, it provides a remarkably broad immunity for states. 
For Judge Noonan, "[t]here's nothing to support the view that 
immunity [for states] was part of the Constitutional design or in-
herent in its plan .... Nowhere in the entire document are the 
states identified as sovereigns" (p. 85, 151). He concludes that 
"[l]ike other common law principles [sovereign immunity for 
49. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (use of substantive due process to 
strike down a state law regulating the maximum hours of work as a violation of liberty of 
contract). 
50. Power to the State, ABA JOURNAL 38-44 (Jan. 2003). 
51. 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002); see, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 
527 U.S. 706 (1999); College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998); 
California v. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. 491 (1998); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898 (1997); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Regents of the Univ. of 
California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); 
Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994). 
52. U.S. CONST., amend. XI. 
2003] BOOK REVIEWS 183 
states] is open to being overridden by federal law and by the 
federal Constitution .... As federal law is the supreme law of the 
land, at no time in the history of the United States has sover-
eignty of the states been intact" (p. 152). 
Judge Noonan acknowledges the arguments for the "judge-
made" state immunity: "to preserve the structure of the federal 
union, to keep it from collapsing into a single unitary system, the 
states must be immune from private lawsuits" (p. 153). He like-
wise recognizes that state sovereignty is needed to preserve the 
states' solvency, (p. 153) and "that the dignity of the state de-
mands it" (p. 154). But his position is clear, if not cursory: "the 
immunity of the fifty states is a relic of the past without justifica-
tion of any kind today" (p. 154). It is a doctrine with a broad 
"penumbra" that has "metastasized" throughout all the "arms," 
entities and subsidiaries of the state government (p. 154). In 
short, it has "swelled beyond bounds," (p. 156) and is one that 
"cannot be consistently applied or reconciled with the federal 
system" (p. 156). Indeed, he asserts, "[i]t is unjust" (p. 156). 
As Narrowing the Nation's Power argues, there is great 
irony today in the Court's conflation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as discussed 
above. After all, the Court, through Justice Rehnquist, had held 
in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer53 that state sovereignty as interpreted 
through the Eleventh Amendment is limited by section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which authorizes Congress "by appro-
priate legislation" to enforce the substantive provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In Fitzpatrick, Justice Rehnquist rea-
soned that: 
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercis-
ing legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the 
constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one 
section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections 
by their own terms embody limitations on state authority. We 
think that Congress may, in determining what is "appropriate 
legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against 
states or state officials which are constitutionally impermissi-
ble in other contexts. 54 
Unfortunately, this logic has been discarded by the Court's more 
recent section 5 decisions which have reduced, drastically, Con-
53. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
54. !d. at 456. 
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gress' power under section 5. Board of Trustees of the University 
of Alabama v. Garretr5 is the most recent example. 
As previously discussed, the Court now places Congress' 
exercise of section 5 under close scrutiny, demanding that before 
Congress can exercise its power "by appropriate legislation"56 it 
must first document that constitutional rights, as determined by 
judicial interpretations, are being violated. In other words, Con-
gress must make an evidentiary record much like a court would 
be required to do before issuing a remedy. Absent such a record, 
Congress lacks "a valid grant of constitutional authority57 under 
section 5 to abrogate state immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment. Moreover, a valid exercise of section 5 powers is 
only present when the legislation is congruent and proportional 
to the injury and the means adopted to correct the injury. The 
Court alone determines, through strict scrutiny standards, 
whether Congress has met this test. The result, as John Noonan's 
apt title states, is an historically important narrowing of the na-
tion's power, at least that of Congress, in reducing section 5's 
check and balance authority over an expansive interpretation of 
immunity for states under the Eleventh Amendment. 
Garrett suggests that the Eleventh Amendment is now a 
check on section 5, rather than vice versa.58 In short, state im-
munity trumps Congress' power to enact legislation to enforce 
equal protection of the laws. As a result, states become insulated 
from suits and liability, the Supreme Court becomes the exclu-
sive authority over constitutional interpretation, and Congress 
loses substantial authority and prerogatives to legislate through 
the democratic process. 
The most extreme articulation of the state sovereignty un-
der the Eleventh Amendment is found in South Carolina State 
Ports Authority. 59 Justice Thomas, writing for the 5-4 Court ma-
jority, ruled that a federal administrative agency under the Elev-
enth Amendment could not adjudicate a private party's com-
plaint against a state agency. The Court, in reaching its decision, 
was not content to limit itself to a textual reading of the Elev-
55. 531 U.S. 356 (2001); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); 
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
56. See Post & Siegel, Protecting, supra note 11, at 5-18. 
57. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363. 
58. Post & Siegel, Protecting, supra note 11, at 18. 
59. 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002). 
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enth Amendment. Plain meaning was too narrow an approach 
for the Court to reach its desired result. In the most strained and 
expansive reading of the amendment to date, Justice Thomas 
stated: "[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope 
of the States' sovereign immunity; it is but one particular exem-
plification of that immunity .... We have understood the Elev-
enth Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for 
the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it con-
firms."60 
Although Justice Thomas conceded that the federal agency 
in question, the Federal Maritime Commission, does not exercise 
"judicial power of the United States," as required by the lan-
guage of the Eleventh Amendment,61 he reaches in a bold stroke 
of judicial activism beyond the amendment to find immunity 
when the nature of the proceedings in a federal agenc1 resem-
bles civillitigation62 and to protect a state's "dignity."6 As Jus-
tice Stevens observed, "the 'dignity' rationale [offered by the 
Court] is 'embarrassingly insufficient."'64 Or, as Justice Breyer 
said: the "principle has no logical starting place ... neither does 
it have any logical stopping point."65 The Thomas logic, at bot-
tom, is without historical support. At best, the logic is escapable. 
CONCLUSION 
Has the Rehnquist Court rewritten the Constitution to ad-
vance federalism beyond anything recognizable in history? Nar-
rowing the Nation's Power makes a strong case that it has. Un-
fortunately, only four justices of the Supreme Court agree. 
Although Judge Noonan's book is not intended to provide a 
close doctrinal analysis of all the Supreme Court's federalism 
cases in the past ten years, it is powerful nevertheless, for the 
story it tells of the reinterpretation of an important American 
constitutional doctrine and political theory. While he does not 
use the term "revisionism," Judge Noonan might well have 
60. /d. at 1871. 
61. /d. 
62. /d. at 1873. 
63. /d. at 1874. 
64. /d. at 1880 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 
44 (1996). 
65. 122 S. Ct. at 1889 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Although Narrowing the Nation's 
Power was in the press at the time South Carolina State Ports Authority was decided, I 
am sure Judge Noonan would share Justice Steven's and Breyer's dismay at the major-
ity's sweeping exercise of judicial activism. See Power to the State, supra note 50, at 41-42. 
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branded the Court's handiwork as such. It fits his theme. Indeed, 
while he offers many conclusions and colorful language to make 
his points, his theme is a sobering one: The Supreme Court is 
engaged in judicial activism66 as it rewrites history in order to 
shift power back to the states at the expense of democratic prin-
ciples and congressional prerogatives. The consequence is that 
the Court's federalism jurisprudence has reached an ascendancy 
and dominance not seen before in history. Moreover, Judge 
Noonan implies that the Court's approach calls into question the 
legitimacy of its judicial decision-making as it gives little defer-
ence to established judicial precedent, historical understandings, 
or democratic processes. Stare decisis as a fundamental con-
straint on the judicial process is discarded in favor of ahistorical 
interpretations and ideology. 67 This indictment of the Court 
comes not from a liberal commentator but from a distinguished, 
conservative judge appointed by President Ronald Reagan. 
The Court's method, as documented by Judge Noonan, has 
been to rewrite incrementally the historical understandings of 
the commerce clause, the Tenth, the Eleventh, and the Four-
teenth Amendments. Only when one reads the Court's opinions 
in combination can one appreciate the full impact of the Court's 
revisionism. The Court has forgotten that the framers of the 
Constitution placed Congress' powers first in the Constitution in 
Article I. It has forgotten Chief Justice Marshall's other impor-
tant contribution- beyond judicial review-namely the principle 
that "National power-especially the power of Congress-would 
be interpreted generously, to allow Congress and the president 
to fashion policies and programs that met the felt necessities of 
the time. "6 
The Rehnquist Court's muscular opinions on federalism 
create many tensions between its expanded view of iudicial re-
view and the other political branches of government.6 Although 
Chief Justice Rehnquist continues to hold Chief Justice Marshall 
66. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Feder-
alism: The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 
2213 (1996). 
67. The Court's federalism decisions since 1995 would make an interesting study 
under the legal process school of jurisprudence since so many precedents are rejected or 
ignored for the sake of the "dignity of the state." 
68. STARR, supra note 45, at 12. 
69. Professor Lynn Baker cast the question this way: "The issue ... is whether judi-
cial review is necessary to maintain and reinforce these [state autonomy] political safe-
guards." Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Fed-
eralism, 46 Y!LL. L. REV. 951, 972 (2001); see also, Lynn Baker & Ernest A. Young, 
Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001). 
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in the highest regard and recognizes him as one of the "founding 
fathers" of the country-he recently called the present Court 
"the lengthened shadow" of Chief Justice Marshall70 -the Court 
selectively ignores the Marshall Court's broad grant of authority 
to Congress, notably through the commerce clause and the rec-
ognition of Congress' status as a coordinate branch of govern-
ment in interpreting the Constitution.71 While judicial review 
may have been the means to achieve the Court's federalism 
goals of strengthening the rights of states at the expense of Con-
gress, ultimately the larger judicial and political shift, as ably 
demonstrated by Judge Noonan, has been structural-judicial 
supremacy over Congress' sovereignty and democratic values. 
Whether we have yet reached the apex of judicial sovereignty 
and activism is unclear. But one can hope that criticism such as 
Judge Noonan's will make the current reign of judicial suprem-
acy no more than a temporary detour in our constitutional his-
tory. For now, judicial sovereignty is the legacy of the Rehnquist 
Court. After Narrowing the Nation's Power, the burden should 
be on the Supreme Court to make a compelling case for its drive 
to rearticulate federalism as an overarching constitutional and 
political doctrine. To date, the Court certainly has not done so. 
70. See Linda Greenhouse, The Last Days of the Rehnquist Court: The Rewards of 
Patience and Power, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 251, 254 (2003) (quoting William H. Rehnquist, 
Remarks from the Bench on the Occasion of the 200th Anniversary of John Marshall's 
Swearing-In as Chief Justice, Feb. 20,2001, J. SUP. Cr. U.S., Oct. Term 2000, at 549. 
7!. See also Post & Siegal, Protecting, supra note 11. 
